Response to PoP I: The Problem of the Empiricist and Intellectualist Account of Perception

In his introduction to Phenomenology of Perception titled “Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena”, Marleau-Ponty problematizes the empirical approach which seeks to objectively describe subjective experience and sensation. This view is what Marleau-Ponty refers to as the Empiricist approach, which presumes that ‘things in the world’ can be formalized and reduced to their objective characteristics; among these empirical ‘things’, includes the phenomena of perception itself. According to this analysis, the categorization of perception occurs through an objective, linguistic categorization into concepts like ‘red’, ‘green’; ‘quality’, ‘size’; etc.–all which are qualities that are then ascribed to various phenomena in the world.

Marleau-Ponty points out how an account of perception as an object which causally reacts to external stimuli, employs a method of deconstruction that reduces all of the constituents of sensation to its physico-chemical properties1. The problem with this outlook, is that our sense of perception is not merely a ‘conductor’, as copper for example is, a metal that has relatively high electrical conductivity and is therefore used in wires for conducting electricity. This presupposition compromises of an understanding of an empirical world in which situated perceiving subjects act in accordance to the same principles and generalizations that inanimate objects are subject to. According to this paradigm, the sensible is defined as an external stimulus that follows the laws of causality—just like a copper wire that conducts electricity from its source, to its destination. This form of understanding about perception is particular prevalent in physiology, where perception is assumed to be an intricate variant of the more simple reflexes in which there is a receiver on one end and a transmitter on the other2. Based on these sensations and stimulation that are causally conducted through the physico-chemical properties of the body’s neural paths, a perception of an external object is then derived.

Marleau-Ponty points out a problem with this method and to which he refers to as the “science of subjectivity”. By employing this science, the understanding of our visual field can never be understood the same scientific generalizations that we make about the empirical world3. As an alternative, Marleau-Ponty offers a way of perceiving the world in terms of relationships, that are not defined in strict and abstract concepts4. Things like the apprehension of the size and the qualities of objects, are dependent on their perceptual context, which exemplifies that the external world is not merely copied by our sense of perception, but constituted by it.5 With an example provided with the red rug, Marleau-Ponty demonstrates that the ‘redness’ of the carpet, is a quality that depends on the spatial surroundings of its environment such as light and interior; along with the material qualities of the carpet itself6. These circumstances along with the qualities of the object, then act as a totality of relationships that becomes defined by our perception as the ‘redness’ of the carpet.

Memory is another capacity of the mind that provides our faculty of perception a context grounded in our past associations, experiences and their relationships. As Marleau-Ponty states, the quality of red of an object, is not merely a transfer of the quality of ‘redness’ from the object to the subject, but a ’redness’ that the subject dominates over the object through their gaze7. This projection of perception onto the external world, is what makes the phenomenological account of the world unique based on the contexts that are associated by the subject. Due to the unique circumstance in which impressions occur, “one impression can never, by itself, be associated with another impression”8. What precludes the association of one impression with another, is the a form that the two impressions lack in common. This view goes inline with Marleau-Ponty’s favor of the Gestalt theory, in which perceptions are deemed as products of complex interactions among various stimuli—in a world that is seemingly chaotic in nature, and which has no structured components through which perception can be objectively defined and categorized. This account of impressions, serves Marleau-Ponty’s critique of not only the Empiricist view, but also the Intellectualist point of view, which seeks to generalize phenomena into precepts and ideas.

By accounting the perceptual context of a sensation and its unique relationships based on memory, past experience, surroundings, etc.; Marleau-Ponty does not necessarily provide a method for establishing certainty like empirical sciences seek to do, but instead, asks us to tolerate ambiguity when attempting to describe the phenomena of perception. He goes on to say that “knowledge can never get hold of its objects” because perceptual phenomena does not have pre-established abstract concepts like numbers do in mathematics, and any attempt that claims to have such an understanding of phenomena, is likely a “deception and illusion”9. Since both, the Empiricist and Intellectualist world views seek to generalize and segregate the meaning of perception into laws, forms, and regularities; Marleau-Ponty offers an account of perception and subjectivity that seeks a middle ground between these two views.

Response to PoP II: Repression and The Body

In the beginning of Part One of his PoP, Marleau-Ponty describes the ways the body is accounted and conceived according to the fields of study such as physiology and psychology. The particular theme around which Marleau-Ponty bases his objections on, are the traditional Empiricist preconceptions and understandings of the psychical and psychological dimension of the human mind and body. Through an exposition of certain methods and preconceptions employed in physiology, Marleau-Ponty responds with a claim that asserts that the body is not merely an object situated within “a geometrical space indifferent to what it contains”, but has its own notion and understanding of spatiality and temporality10. These specific understandings of spatiality are grounded in not only the way being appears to consciousness from the first-person perspective, but also on how perception is inherently intertwined with the body as a totality—its organs, body parts, etc.—through which the subject perceives the world and develops their own understanding of spatiality and temporality. As Marleau-Ponty succinctly puts it, “I am conscious of the world by means of my body.”11 The world, and the phenomena within it, are perceived (and made conscious) by the body based on the circumstance in which it exists—the irreducible constituents of the body itself, and the “milieu” of being, its projects, its social relations, its intersubjectivity.

Because the body is a whole through which a being perceives and has an understanding of its own phenomenological world, certain tensions arise when it encounters certain circumstances that disrupt this understanding. One of these oppositions is what Marleau-Ponty refers to as repression, a term he borrows from psychoanalysis. Repression occurs when a subject is forced to no longer look through their phenomenal field of first-person bodily existence, but through an impersonal, objectified perspective that is mediated and imposed on them12. Marleau-Ponty distinguishes these two forms of existence as personal existence and impersonal existence; in the case of repression, the former is repressed by the latter13. In the example of the phantom limb, Marleau-Ponty demonstrates how the presence of a phantom limb, is a desperate attempt of the body to reclaim a certain “repressed experience” of personal existence that is now unavailable due the lack of a limb, which disrupts the totality of the phenomenal field through which the subject perceives their being14.

Because the subject struggles to grasp phenomena through a body whose totality had been disrupted, they are frequently compelled to understand the world normatively, in objective, impersonal terms. Seeing a psychiatrist when one has some mental diagnosis, or seeing a physiologist when one has a damaged limb; are perhaps one of many examples in which normative standards of medical and mental treatment seek to normatively re-establish order of the body15. Due to the impersonal nature of these acts, they are seen as an act of repression to the body of the subject, which cause them to feel a particular enxiety—an antagony against a force that imposes impersonal existence on them16. As Marleau-Ponty explains, “[a]ll repression is thus the passage from first person existence to a sort of scholastic view of this existence”17. In the act of this repression, the body finds itself in a situation in which it is unable to cope with, and renounces reality through “a flight into autism” which seeks to obliterate the objective world, and find renunciation with genuine personal existence18.

The lack of limb which causes the phenomena of the “phantom limb”, is an example of how the body attempts to renounce and recover its severed phenomenal field. This process cannot be explained neither in psychical nor in physiological conception alone, and the two approaches must be combined in order to provide a more adequate explanation. Even primitive animal reflexes are not mere blind physiological processes that casually react to stimulation, but contain a certain expression of a “behavioral milieu”, a “pre-objective perspective” that attempts to affirm a particular form of “being in the world”19. The feeling of a lack of certain body parts however, is not the only cause for the feeling of repression. A body may feel repression not only due to impersonal, “scholastic” forces, but also due to its innate composition: when a body might feel excess or unbelonging to some of its own body parts. This feeling can be innate from an individual’s birth. Marleau-Ponty briefly mentions what resembles like dysphoria, or more specifically, somatoparaphrenia: where one denies ownership of a limb or an entire side of one’s body, a situation in which a person might “sense a second person implanted within his body. He is a man in one half of his body, a woman in the other”20. With the presence of inconsistencies and disruptions within the body, Marleau-Ponty seeks to demonstrate how existence and perception are inherently intertwined within the body. Since physiology and psychology employ particular methods of objectivization around which phenomena are generalized, Marleau-Ponty offers a way of looking at that the body as something that embodies a particular phenomenological horizon from which a unique phenomenological perspective of the subject is centered.

Response to PoP III: The Fragile Intentionality of The Body

In the middle and towards the end of “Part One: The Body” of his PoP , Merleau-Ponty expounds on a phenomenological basis, the way in which the body of a being incorporates a “bodily space” in which a unique milieu is constituted within the existence of a being21. This space consists of a particular intentionality through which a body projects its own phenomenological understanding and relation in the world. This unique constitutive whole of the body, consists of a projection of temporality and signification onto the world through a set of categories that are unique to the being, which cannot be subjected neither to empirical explanation, nor intellectualist reflection, but instead, must remain subjected solely to an existential mode of understanding22. Through an exposition of how this constitutive totality of the body becomes repressed or ruptured physiologically (through phantom limbs, prosthetics, etc.) and psychologically (through dyslexia, aphonia, etc. ) , Merleau-Ponty proceeds to define how these ruptures consist of an inability of the body to project its own being in the world. A being that had been raptured from any of the above mentioned causes, escapes into what can be generally summed up by Merleau-Ponty as a “flight into autism”23, in which the body deliberately refuses to interact with the external world (for example, through language communication and other forms of intersubjective forms interaction) and would rather live in a disorderly existence in which there is an external world that does not promise sense nor meaning to the body. Even the conception of time, which is most frequently viewed and understood by normal subjects as a linear “temporal vector”, becomes a meaningless notion for a repressed body; future and past become nothing but the “‘shriveled up’ continuations of the present”24. The body also denies space, because beneath this “objective space” there is a “primordial spatiality” of the body in which it can visualizes itself25. As much as repression reveals the phenomenological and existential significance of being in the world, to the subject, it resembles a trauma due to the being’s intentionality being repressed by the ruptures of its body.

Although Merleau-Ponty does demonstrate how a change in the extensions through which the body interacts with the world can entail traumatic consequences for the body, it is nevertheless a crucial development that permits the body to develop its own intentionality as it dwells in the world. Such a stage is crucial in the development in the infant stage of a child, for example, in the case where “children, during the first nine months of life, only distinguish globally between the colored and the achromatic; subsequently, colored areas become articulated into “warm” and “cool” shades, and eventually detailed colors are obtained.”26In this development, a child learns how to perceive and distinguish particular colors, which would be considered to be a normal development as the child learns the way of perceiving the phenomena of color and perception according to customary ways. However, there are other ways in which the body can become acquainted with a new way of navigating and perceiving the world. Such an example includes a blind man’s cane, which no longer functions as a mere external object, but creates a “sensitive zone” for the body of the blind man which becomes “analogous to a gaze”27. What occurred, is that the blind man’s body acquired a new way of signifying its own “situational”28and “primordial”29spatiality, which contrasts with the Cartesian, objective and empirical conception of space.

This unique totality of the body’s milieu and intentionality, is what makes a body a “work of art”30 that offers a particular ontological signification that cannot be fully conveyed through a universal language that resides outside of its bounds. This can be tied to what Merleau-Ponty considers to be the incapacity of language to function as a means of communicating and/or translating the sense and intentionality of a particular body because of its unique ways of signifying its spatiality, temporality, sexuality, being in the world, and existence.31 By demonstrating the unique interrelations of the body, Merleau-Ponty turns to examples where physiological forms of repression, cause the body to becomes traumatized by its being in the world. In the example with a young woman who was forbidden to see a young man that she loves, caused the woman to no longer be able to swallow food and who also loses her speech through a phenomena called aphonia32. This inability to speak passes as soon as the woman regains the permission to see the young man that she loves.33 In the case with aphonia, is not merely a refusal of the young woman to speak, but a consequence of the sexuality of her body being subjected to a from of repression that makes it want to cut off its intersubjective relations and communication with others.34 Since the language is a method of communicating with the intersubjective world that consists of other bodies–which also happens to be the source of the body’s repression–the body can no longer consider the outside world as a source for its “sense and form” in life, and decides to instead remain secluded within itself, in its own “life’s hiding place”. This kind of a response is precisely the “flight into autism” caused from quasi-existential trauma in which the external world cannot promise sense nor recognition to the existence of a body23.

Response to PoP IV: The Being and the World

In the beginning and towards the middle of “Part Two: The Perceived World” of his PoP, Merleau-Ponty describes the way in which the world manifests itself within the milieus of our bodies. If “Part One” was about the unique constitutive whole of the body through which the phenomenology of perception is mediated, “Part Two” is about the world that exists out there, which is then taken up by this perception of the body. This unique totality of perception, is one of the key ideas that Merleau-Ponty emphasizes on, in that it constitutes the reality of being, and is irreducible to any third-person perspective. The uniqueness of our being in the world, and our perception of it, compromises of the unique combination of the senses of our body that allow us to perceive reality in ways that are irreducible into neither empiricist, nor intellectualist concepts, ideas, and functions.

One of they key aspects that demonstrates the synthesis of two senses, not only by ones that diverge in their function (such as the senses of taste and smell), but also when two organs of the same sense (such as two ears or two eyes) are combined to produce a form of perception that is irreducible to the perception of these individual organs, which when together combined, constitute a unique synthesis of perception. Such is the case of the “double vision” permitted thanks to the presence of two sight organs35. What occurs in the synthesis of binocular vision, is not reducible to a “third person process” that would categorize the occurrence as a assimilation process by the two organs of sight, but as a constitutive totality that generates a “unique gaze” through which spatial objects are taken up by the senses of the body. In the transition from monocular to binocular vision, one will experience how the perceived object would no longer pose as something being “vaguely in front of the things”—comparable to the flatness that one would find in the depictions of still life paintings—and instead, the object is “absorbed” into the world in which being encounters the world through its particular body schema36. What Merleau-Ponty suggests we can learn from binocular vision, is the way in which two senses, when enacted simultaneously, produce a new type of synthesis of perception that transfigures the spatial object in certain ways37.

Although the transition from monocular to binocular (or theoretically even, decacular, if one had 10 eyes) vision presents a potential of our perception to grasp objects in their complete perspectival totality, this never becomes phenomenologically possible—and is almost a contradiction in terms. To demonstrate this difficulty, a previous example by Merleau-Ponty can be given: a house, which can be only seen from a particular angle—whether is from the street, an airplane, or inside it—but which can never be seen from all perspectives at once38. When one grasps an object in its complete “reality”, one also “steals it from [their] possession” but also objectifies it, while also annihilating it: the house would no longer be anything since “the house itself [becomes a] house seen from nowhere”. Another example consists of a cube, which according to the third-person empirical view, and the intellectualist theoretical view, is considered to be an object with six equal sides39. But according to the first-person body point of view, the cube never has six equal sides, and what constitutes the perception of the cube is a mediation of bodily experience that produces a movement which conditions the perception of the object. When one attempts to conceive an object in its complete perspective, through a “reflective analysis”, one also takes for granted the object while not wondering what the object really is, which also destroys “the objects internal structure”40. What occurs in this total perspective, is a transition from a particular, spatial, and phenomenological point of view, to a form of a totalized intellectualism41, which is physically and phenomenologically impossible since a total conception of an object also requires a complete transcendence of our perception of the object.

If grasping an object in its complete perceptual totality through the limited faculties of our perception is impossible, can intellectualism or empiricism fulfill this requirement? For Merleau-Ponty, this appears to be impossible, because the object must “ceas[e] to exist in order to know”42. Although Merleau-Ponty does himself question whether his phenomenological view is plausible, he does suggest that if reflection “wants to justify itself as reflection … as progress towards the truth, then it must not limit itself to replacing one view of the world by another.” If reflection seeks to replace the unreflective, pre-objective, phenomenological point of view, then it must first clarify and understand what exactly it is replacing. Just as a philosopher, who “might describe the fauna of a distant land–without noticing that he himself also perceives”, must first realize that his first-person experience also provides a unique phenomenological account of the object of his thought–before choosing to denounce it in favor of an intellectualist description of the fauna43. Here, the perspective that we take in order to account the world surrounding the milieus of our bodies, can only occur within the finitude of our faculties of perception. Out of all the milieus of perception, we handle only one perspective at a time–which is never total nor infinite and finding what the thing-in-itself according to some a priori principles is something we can never achieve. But nevertheless, the synthesis of our organs of perception constitutes the particularity of the way we perceive objects in the world–which for Merleau-Ponty, is an a priori in itself.

Response to PoP V: Objectivity of Phenomena and the Problem of Intersubjectivity it Entails

In “Section III: The Perceived World” of his PoP, Merleau-Ponty sets to describe—and question—whether an objectivity of a thing or a phenomena can be established. The basic premise of what is, for example, the size of an object, and how this attribute can be objectively determined and agreed upon—which would also establish the foundation on which further knowledge of the object can be established—is a simple proposition that entails numerous complications44. At first, concerning the size of the object; coming up with a standard that would empirically determine size through a unit of measurement—might at first seem as a method sufficient for establishing objective properties of an object. However, this form of objectification disregards the perspective through which an object is seen, which is the qualitative totality of the object and ones unique experience of it through the phenomena of perception45. The problem of establishing attributes that would objectively determine the qualities of an object—and the way it is perceived—is a question that puts many things at stake. If all properties of an object are subjective and unique, is there any possibility for reconciling the multiple experiences that are manifested in the milieus of different bodies? If everyone has a solipsistic conception of reality which cannot be externalized through expression and communication, what implication does this have on our intersubjective relations with others? If objectivity of things and their reality must be established, does that mean we must omit phenomena like hallucinations?—Which for Marleu-Ponty, are fictions that are counted as reality by hallucinating subjects in a manner analogous to the operation by which “reality” is reached and established by normal subjects46.

If we start with the very basic question of what really constitutes the quality of an object, one immediately falls into numerous difficulties. In the example of two large boxes containing an eye-hole—“the first one painted white and the other painted black, the first one weakly illuminated, the other strongly illuminated, in such a way that the quantity of light received by the eye is the same in both cases.”47 What is demonstrated in this experiment, is that becomes nearly impossible to discern the box that has a white interior from the box that has a black one, even if these are two opposite colors. One only starts to discern which box is black or white when one puts a sheet of paper with a contrasting color (a white sheet for the black box, a black sheet for the white box) inside the box. What the box experiment demonstrates, is precisely the difficulty of discerning and objectifying a quality of an object, whether it is its color, size, quality, etc. The problem that is entailed behind this, is a similar problem encountered in “Part One” that talks about the problem of intentionality of the body. Here is particular, the difficulty arises in the the separation of foreground (the object itself) from its background. As Merleau-Ponty quotes Goldstein from his Über die Abhägigkeit:

We execute our movements in a space that is not “empty” and without relation to them, but which is, on the contrary, in a highly determined relation with them: movement and background are only, in fact, moments artificially separated from a single whole. 48

What this quote demonstrates, is the difficulty of establishing an attribute of a specific phenomena or an object without also artificially separating it from the totality of circumstances in which it was perceived. The same could be said for determining the color, size, and quality of objects. This also applies to other examples (which perhaps, also points to the point about intersubjective relations between a multiplicity of bodies), particularly when two bodies touch, both of them can interpret the touch differently depending on the circumstances and milieus of these bodies. Here, a tactical experience of a touch cannot be reduced to the mere physical tactical stimulation that one receives on the ends of ones fingertips, or other parts of the body. If one takes the situation where one touches the hand of another person, the body schemas of the two people would have a particular relation to that specific touch; whether it is an accidental touch by a stranger on the subway—which the body may experience a slight repulsive feeling towards, or when one touches a person towards whom one feels affection: both touches emerge into something beyond what is empirically accounted as two bodies merely touching one another, but instead, the phenomena of touch emreges into something unique that constituted out of “the totality of the actual or possible phenomenal body” of the two bodies that are touching49. In both cases, the phenomena of touch is not a mere stimulation since the particular “echo” that resonates within each of these bodies is unique, which make them respond differently to what can be empirically considered to be a touch with already established properties.

If one where to apply a stimulation to the body while the body doesn’t even notice, the phenomena as such, cannot be even thought to exist. This is precisely what marks the distinction between an all encompassing perceiving God, and a body which feels through the finitude of its being and body schema50. For M-P, If I’m not part of the experience, then I’m outside of it, and can only view perception thought the finite “horizon of all perception”. If nothing occurred within this horizon, then it didn’t happen simply because a body is not an infinite substance that is capable of perceiving all phenomena at once—as if it where an all encompassing God whose infinitude allows to grasp all phenomena there can possibly be. Here, Merleau-Ponty puts an emphasis on the importance of phenomena as it is grasped through our body, as apposed to relying on some form of synthesis that is done through the faculties of our understanding.51 One of the methods that is employed by our faculty of understanding is categorizing phenomena and things into their attributes.

But if common attributes of things cannot be established, how are intersubjective relations even possible? It appears that Merleau-Ponty does not offer a definite way out of the solipsistic mode of sharing and living in a world with others—in which objects and phenomena do not have attributes that could be fully communicable, and all that we are left with, is not “being-with-others”, but a “solipsism-shared-by-many”52. However, this does not necessarily entail a problem with grave consequence, but something that can be potentially embraced. Even if solipsism cannot be fully overcome, certain aspects of existence of the body can be mediated and worked out, while others cannot be. This opens up dual-mode of being; where one is being-in-itself which can be extended throughout out empirical space, while the other is being-for-itself which entails a incommunicability of ones particular milieu and body schema53. Merleau-Ponty however, introduces a “third genre” of being which is a synthesis of the first two, in which on one hand “withdraws from the objective world”, and on the other, losses its subjective “purity” and becomes integrated into a form of primordial unity of a “body-for-us”.54 This new, third mode of being, opens up a new potentiality of being that one transcends towards—but never fully does. It is this transcendence which opens up a precondition for a new dimensionality of being where on shares an intersubjective world of relations with others.55

  1. Phenomenology of Perception, p.11 ↩

  2. Phenomenology of Perception, p.7 ↩

  3. Phenomenology of Perception, p.7 ↩

  4. Phenomenology of Perception, p.4 ↩

  5. Phenomenology of Perception, p.9 ↩

  6. Phenomenology of Perception, p.5 ↩

  7. Phenomenology of Perception, p.14 ↩

  8. Phenomenology of Perception, p.18 ↩

  9. Phenomenology of Perception, p.16 ↩

  10. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 55 ↩

  11. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 84 ↩

  12. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 55 (re-check) ↩

  13. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 86 ↩

  14. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 88 ↩

  15. One may see how this thought in particular was laid out explicitly by Michel Foucault, who’s influence from Merleau-Ponty can be expounded here in particular. In his History of Madness (1961) and The Birth of the Clinic (1963), Foucault exemplifies a study of the emergence of the modern concept of “mental illness” in Europe. In this account, Foucault provides an account of the prejudices of modern psychiatry, which classified abnormalities of the body (whether psychical or physiological) according to the standards of “empirical disciplines”. This form of treatment of illness, is precisely the form of repression that are instigated within social institutions that disrupt the phenomenological totality of an individual’s body. If Merleau-Ponty provided the philosophical account of repression of the body, Foucault expounded how this problem is agonized in the organization of certain social, medical, and mental institutions. ↩

  16. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 85 ↩

  17. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 85 ↩

  18. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 88 ↩

  19. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 81 ↩

  20. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 91 ↩

  21. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 139 ↩

  22. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 138 ↩

  23. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 88 ↩ ↩2

  24. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 137 ↩

  25. Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 149-51 ↩

  26. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 33 ↩

  27. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 144 ↩

  28. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 102 ↩

  29. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 149 ↩

  30. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 152 ↩

  31. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 193 ↩

  32. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 163 ↩

  33. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 164 ↩

  34. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 167 ↩

  35. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 241 ↩

  36. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 242 ↩

  37. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 233 ↩

  38. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 69 ↩

  39. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 209 ↩

  40. Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 210-11 ↩

  41. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 242 ↩

  42. Ibid. ↩

  43. Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 214 ↩

  44. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 313 ↩

  45. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 312 ↩

  46. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 358 ↩

  47. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 321 ↩

  48. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 139 ↩

  49. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 330 ↩

  50. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 317 ↩

  51. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 343 ↩

  52. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 376 ↩

  53. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 365 ↩

  54. Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 366-7 ↩

  55. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 379 ↩